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Most systems analysts would be familiar with the 
way in which systems or sub-systems can rapidly 
flip from one state to another. Sales of electric cars, 
for example may spend years in a pattern of slow 
growth, but at some stage there will almost certainly 
be a rapid market uptake, before they achieve 
a degree of saturation. Similarly, in the opposite 
direction, facsimile machines suddenly went out  
of fashion.
In the physical world of interacting technical and 
economic systems such phenomena are explained 
by externalities: my ownership of an electric car 
is likely to support industries providing charging 
stations and services, making it more attractive  
for you to have an electric car. The switching from 
one state to another will generally be consistent  
with the mathematical model embodied in the 
familiar ‘S’ shaped logistic curve. It’s difficult for  
the analyst to predict when a system will flip, but  
he or she can have a reasonably robust model of 
how the flip will occur. 
To what extent do subtle policy 
‘nudges’ impinge on people’s 
freedom of choice? How do social 
movements such as #MeToo 
suddenly gain momentum? Policy 
commentator Ian McAuley reflects 
on the insights and arguments 
offered in Cass Sunstein’s most 
recent book.
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Social systems are more difficult to analyse. Why 
do certain patterns of social behaviour suddenly 
change? Why do phenomena such as the #MeToo 
movement suddenly arise? Why was it that Rosa 
Parks’ act of defiance in December 1955, when 
she refused to move her seat in a bus to make way 
for ‘white’ passengers, set off a massive civil rights 
movement in the USA? 
Such phenomena are often simply described as 
‘emergent’, as if the systems in which they are 
manifest are black boxes with too much interactive 
complexity to allow for explanation or analysis. 
But systems scholars have looked inside the black 
box and have developed explanatory models, 
most notably Thomas Schelling’s ‘tipping’ model, 
which helps explain how the racial composition of 
residential neighbourhoods could rapidly switch: 
a harmonious multiracial neighbourhood could 
become mono-racial in a short time, with the change 
triggered by the decisions of just a few individuals.1 
Schelling pioneered agent-based modelling, showing 
how the dynamics of complex systems may be 
explained by seeing how individual cells (households, 
individuals) interact with their ‘neighbours’, and 
through repeated iterations how the decisions by  
a few individuals can lead to system-wide effects  
if the system is near its tipping point.
The behavioural economist Cass Sunstein, co-author 
of Nudge,2 in his most recent work How Change 
Happens, takes us into the black box from another 
perspective. He analyses ‘social cascades’ – small 
perturbations that can produce huge shifts. His 
approach is from the perspective of social norms. 
Some cascades can be triggered by people who feel 
free to break from assumed norms. His proposition 
is that:
… when norms start to collapse people are 
unleashed, in the sense that they feel free 
to reveal what they believe and prefer, to 
disclose their experiences, and talk and act 
as they wish. (emphasis Sunstein’s)
The #MeToo movement is one such phenomenon 
he analyses. It is aptly named, for the unleashing 
is, indeed, a ‘me too’ phenomenon. It suddenly 
becomes permissible for others to follow the 
example of those who break the taboo, and as 
Sunstein explains, new norms become established  
in a short time.
An illustration Sunstein might have chosen is 
Hannah Arendt’s description of the short-lived 
1956 Hungarian uprising, when a small student 
demonstration grew into a major social movement 
that, within a few days, managed to form an entirely 
new government, with very little violence.3 Arendt’s 
account of the uprising is that the students realised 
that the Hungarian people were ‘living amid lies’ of 
the authoritarian communist regime. They were 
unleashed from having to pretend that the Soviet 
model of communism, which guided their puppet 
government, actually embodied the values Marx 
had championed. Although the new Hungarian 
order lasted less than three weeks before it was 
suppressed by a Soviet invasion, Arendt’s point was 
that the revolution clearly illustrated the fragility 
of norms that have been waiting for someone to 
question them. Had she lived to 1989 she would 
have observed the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
a collapse which was triggered by some minor 
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developments in the Soviet empire periphery,  
and which caught most observers by surprise. 
Sunstein points out that it’s hard or perhaps 
impossible to predict when such shifts will occur, 
because, as in Hungary before the unleashing, 
people don’t know what others are thinking, and 
hide or falsify their own preferences. As the old 
army joke goes, the officers have not given their 
underlings ‘permission to think’, and even when  
they do another level of permission is needed to 
allow them to express their thoughts.
He points to a survey that reveals that most young 
men in Saudi Arabia believe that women should be 
given more freedom from the harsh guardianship 
laws, but because they falsely believe that most 
others support the guardianship laws, they don’t  
feel they have permission to speak their own views.
The challenge for those seeking change is to 
develop a critical mass of people willing to be 
‘norm entrepreneurs’ – the people who are the 
first to poke their heads above the parapets of 
self-censorship and to do so with confidence and a 
feeling of safety. In his emphasis on such small groups 
his analysis comes close to that of Schelling’s, but 
strangely he does not mention Schelling’s work, even 
though they have both been professors at Harvard’s 
Kennedy School.
Although How Change Happens starts with insights 
about how social change happens, it shifts from 
a descriptive work to a discussion about how 
policymakers should promote change, unsurprisingly 
re-visiting the ground covered in Nudge, known 
by behavioural economists as the design of 
‘choice architecture’. To what extent do nudges – 
mechanisms that reduce the search and transaction 
costs of following a policymaker’s preferred decisions 
– interfere with people’s freedom of choice? There 
is no clear answer: where there are clear positive 
externalities such as is the case with vaccinations the 
ethical case for a nudge to do the right thing is easy 
(providing free vaccinations is a typical nudge), but 
at the other extreme, when the policymakers are 
captured by those seeking privileges for a particular 
industry, a nudge favouring the industry in question 
would be unethical by most people’s standards.
Sunstein moves on to address some of the most 
difficult ethical questions in public policy, the 
conflicting value frameworks of consequentialist 
and deontologist morality, consequentialists being 
more concerned with the ethics of ends, while 
deontologists are concerned also with means. 
To take a topical Australian issue, the indefinite 
detention of asylum-seekers arriving by boat, a 
consequentialist may argue that the policy is justified 
because the benefits (saving lives of those who might 
drown on the risky voyage) outweigh the costs (the 
misery of the detainees), while a deontologist may 
take the firm moral view that it is never right to use 
people as exploited objects to achieve other ends, 
no matter how worthy those ends may be.
He draws on Daniel Kahneman’s System 1 (fast) and 
System 2 (slow) thinking frameworks to distinguish 
the way ethical choices are made, tentatively 
suggesting that ‘deontological thinking often emerges 
from automatic processing and that consequential 
thinking is often more calculative and deliberative’, 
and that deontological thinking may be a ‘mere 
heuristic’ to ease System 1 thinking.4 But he does 
not fall into the normative trap of concluding that a 
deontological moral framework inevitably leads to 
poorer outcomes. A simple summary of his advice 
to policymakers is that the deontologist should 
go through a rigorous System 2 consequentialist 
examination of any policy proposal, even if he or  
she is committed to rely on a hard deontological 
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moral rule as a final decision guide. To illustrate  
with the asylum-seeker case, application of Sunstein’s 
principle would suggest that the deontologist,  
even if he or she remains absolutely opposed to 
detention of asylum-seekers, should think through  
to the consequences of such a stance. 
His arguments for consequentialist thinking are  
most strongly asserted in a chapter on rights, where 
he argues for a dispassionate cost-effectiveness 
approach to rights and to dealing with crime. 
Consequentialists, he argues ‘favor theories of 
punishment that are based on deterrence, and they 
firmly reject retributivism’. He draws on behavioural 
and neuroscientific research which finds that 
‘deontological judgements are rooted in automatic, 
emotional processing’. In economic terms it may  
be a waste of resources to inflict any more 
punishment on a wrongdoer than is necessary  
to ensure compliance.
In many cases individuals may incur net personal 
costs to punish a wrongdoer. Believing that a local 
garage is overcharging for gasoline, for example, 
someone who believes in retribution drive a long 
distance to fill up at a cheaper garage, incurring a net 
cost when time and vehicle costs are considered. 
That’s the cost of retribution.
As Kahneman and Tversky point out, our tendency 
to such behaviour is based on our perception of 
the extent that the merchant is taking advantage 
of his or her market power, rather than a simple 
calculation of the cost of time.5 By any utilitarian 
(consequentialist) calculation such behaviour is 
irrational. But economic philosophers taking a wider 
systems view, such as Robert Axelrod, argue that 
from a social perspective such behaviour, although 
costly to the individual, may be of net benefit to 
the society: the costly punishment inflicted by the 
individual is a positive externality that accrues to 
the whole society.6 Sunstein, like most behavioural 
economists (his first discipline is actually law) 
acknowledges that certain firm moral rules may be 
hard-wired into the way our thinking has evolved, 
leading to a System 1 way of acting, and while he 
acknowledges that they may have certain advantages 
in terms of social evolution, he does not explore 
these advantages.
Like Nudge, this work is really one for the 
policymaker. Nudge itself was a valuable 
contribution to the art of policymaking, even if many 
policymakers tended to see ‘libertarian paternalism’ 
as the sole contribution of behavioural economics 
to public policy, while overlooking all the other 
possible policy-related contributions the discipline 
can contribute. In How Change Happens Sunstein 
makes another valuable contribution in filling a gap 
between economics and moral philosophy. It should 
be a handbook for all those engaged in shaping 
public policy. 
Cass Sunstein How Change Happens,  
MIT Press, New Haven 2019. 344 pages.
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